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In this paper, we use a panel of 609 UK firms over the period 1980-2000 to test for the existence of a 
trade credit channel of transmission of monetary policy, and for whether this channel plays an 
offsetting effect on the traditional credit channel. We estimate error-correction inventory investment 
equations augmented with the coverage  ratio and the trade credit to assets ratio,  differentiating the 
effects of the latter variables across firms more or less likely to face financing constraints, and firms 
making a high/low use of trade credit. Our results suggest that both the credit and the trade credit 
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1.  Introduction 
According to the credit channel, monetary policy  is transmitted to the real economy 
through its effects on bank loans (bank lending channel) and firms’ balance sheet 
variables (balance sheet channel). In the case of a tightening in monetary policy, for 
instance, bank loans supplies to firms are reduced. This diminishes the ability of those 
firms that are more bank-dependent to carry out desired investment and employment 
plans. Similarly, a tightening in monetary policy is associated with a  rise in 
borrowers’ debt-service burdens, a reduction in the present value of their 
collateralizable resources, and a reduction in their cash flow and  net worth. Once 
again, this makes it more difficult and/or more costly for firms for which asymmetric 
information issues are more relevant to obtain loans, forcing them to reduce their 
activities (Mishkin, 1995; Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). 
A number of studies have estimated regressions of firms’ investment in fixed 
capital or inventories on cash flow, the coverage ratio
1, the stock of liquidity, or other 
balance sheet variables, on various sub-samples of firms. These types of regressions 
can be seen as indirect tests for the existence of a credit channel of transmission of 
monetary policy. In fact, if a firm’s activity is strongly affected by financial variables, 
then, in periods of tight monetary policy, when the supply of bank loans is reduced 
and all firms’ financial situations become worse, this firm will have to contract its 
activity. Furthermore, if the credit channel were operative, one would expect financial 
variables to mainly affect the behavior of those firms which are relatively more 
constrained in credit markets (namely more bank-dependent firms, which are typically 
smaller, younger, and less collateralized), and this effect to be stronger in periods of 
recession and tight monetary policy.  
The majority of the above mentioned studies have found a positive correlation 
between financial variables and firms’ activities, generally stronger for firms facing 
tighter financing constraints (see for instance Fazzari et al., 1988; Kashyap et al., 
1994; Carpenter et al., 1994, 1998; Guariglia, 1999, 2000 etc.). Yet, other authors, 
who have mainly focused on firms’ investment behavior, have found that the 
sensitivity of investment to financial variables is in fact weaker for firms likely to face 
                                                 
1 The coverage ratio is defined as the ratio between the firm’s total profits before tax and before interest 
and its total interest payments. It indicates the availability of internal funds that firms can use to finance 
their real activities and can also be thought of as a proxy for the premium that firms have to pay for 
external finance (Guariglia, 1999). The coverage ratio has been widely used in the literature on the 
effects of financing constraints on firms’ activities (see Carpenter et al., 1998; Gertler and Gilchrist, 
1994; Guariglia and Schiantarelli, 1998; Guariglia, 1999, 2000; and Whited, 1992).   3 
particularly strong financing constraints (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Cleary, 1999). 
The latter findings cast a cloud over the existence and the actual strength of a credit 
channel
2. 
One argument which could be put forward to explain why some firms exhibit 
a low sensitivity of investment to financial variables is that, particularly in periods 
when bank-lending is rationed, or, more in general, when external finance becomes 
more difficult to obtain and/or more costly, these firms make use of another source of 
finance to overcome liquidity shortages, namely trade credit. 
Trade credit (i.e. accounts payable) is given by short-term loans provided by 
suppliers to their c ustomers upon purchase of their products. It is automatically 
created when the customers delay payment of their bills to the suppliers. Trade credit 
is typically more expensive than bank credit especially when customers do not use the 
early payment discount (Petersen and Rajan, 1997)
3. Yet, according to Berger and 
Udell (1998), in 1993, 15.78% of the total assets of small US businesses were funded 
by trade credit. Similarly, Rajan and Zingales (1995) document that in 1991, funds 
loaned to customers  represented 17.8% of total assets for US firms, 22% for UK 
firms, and more than 25% for countries such as Italy, France, and Germany. Finally, 
according to Kohler et al. (2000), 55% of the total short-term credit received by UK 
firms during the period 1983-95 took the form of trade credit. 
It is therefore possible, that even in periods of tight monetary policy and 
recession, when bank loans are harder to obtain and/or more costly, financially 
constrained firms are not forced to reduce their investment too much  as they can 
finance it with trade credit
4. Trade credit issuance can increase in periods of tight 
                                                 
2 Cummins et al. (1999); Bond and Cummins (2001); and Bond et al. (2002) estimated Q-models of 
investment augmented with cash flow, where firms’ investment opportunities are more accurately 
controlled for than in traditional models, and found that the coefficients associated with cash flow were 
poorly determined for all types of firms. They therefore concluded that cash flow attracted a positive 
coefficient in studies such as Fazzari et al. (1988) simply because it proxied for investment 
opportunities, which were not properly captured by the traditionally used measures of  Q. This 
conclusion is challenged by Carpenter and Guariglia (2003). 
3 A common form of trade credit contract is known as the “2/10 net 30” type. “2/10” means that the 
buyer gets a 2% discount for payment within 10 days. “Net 30” means that full payment is due 30 days 
after the invoice date. After that date, the customer is in default. The combination of a 2% discount for 
payment within 10 days and a net period ending on day 30 defines an implicit interest rate of 43.9%, 
which can be seen as the opportunity cost to the buyer to forgo the discount in exchange for 20 
additional days of financing (Ng et al., 1999; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Unfortunately, the data that 
we use in this study do not contain information on when the buyers making use of trade credit actually 
make their payments. 
4 Biais and G ollier (1997) claim that by using trade credit, firms that cannot initially access bank debt 
may actually enhance their subsequent access to bank debt. The use of trade credit can in fact be seen 
as a signal revealing to banks the suppliers’ unique information relative to the firm, and causing banks   4 
money  (we will refer to this phenomenon as the trade credit channel hereafter) 
because the risks of issuing trade credit are always lower than those of issuing bank 
loans: suppliers can in fact closely monitor their clients during the normal course of 
business; they can threaten to cut off future supplies to enforce repayment; and can 
easily repossess goods in case of failed payment (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Kohler et 
al., 2000)
5.  The presence of  a  trade credit  channel  could therefore weaken the 
relationship between firms’ real activities and traditionally used financial variables, 
such as the coverage ratio and cash flow, and more in general, could weaken  the 
credit channel of transmission of monetary policy. 
Although the hypothesis that a  trade credit  channel  might weaken the 
traditional credit channel was first suggested in 1960 by Meltzer
6, recent empirical 
tests of the hypothesis are limited. Using US data, Nilsen (2002) shows that during 
contractionary monetary policy episodes, small firms and those large firms lacking a 
bond rating or sufficient collateralizable assets increase their trade credit finance. 
Similarly, Choi  and Kim (2003) find that both accounts payable and receivable 
increase with tighter monetary policy. Using UK data, Mateut and Mizen (2002) and 
Mateut et al. (2002) show that while bank lending typically declines in periods of 
tight monetary policy, trade credit issuance increases, smoothing out the impact of the 
policy. Focusing on net trade credit, Kohler et al. (2000) observe a similar pattern. 
Based on a disequilibrium model that allows for the possibility of transitory credit 
rationing, Atanasova and Wilson (2004)  find that to avoid bank credit rationing, 
smaller UK companies increase their reliance on inter-firm credit. De Blasio (2003) 
uses Italian data and finds some weak evidence in favour of the hypothesis that firms 
substitute trade credit for bank credit during periods of monetary tightening. Finally, 
Valderrama (2003) shows that  Austrian firms use trade credit to diminish their 
dependence on internal funds. Except for the latter two studies, which are based on 
                                                                                                                                            
to update their beliefs about the quality of the firm, which might lead them to start supplying funds to 
the firm (also see Alphonse et al., 2003). 
5 By helping a customer in difficulty to stay in business, suppliers may actually benefit in the longer 
run, through future sales made to that customer (Atanasova and Wilson, 2001). Calorimis et al. (1995) 
provide evidence that in periods of recession, large firms borrow in order to extend more finance to 
their financially constrained customers. Furthermore, Cunat (2003) documents that when customers 
experience temporary liquidity shocks that may threaten their survival, suppliers tend to forgive their 
debts and extend their maturity periods at no extra cost (also see Petersen and Rajan, 1997; and Wilner, 
2000). Finally, it should also be noted that lending through trade credit might also serve non-financial 
purposes: for instance, firms can use trade credit to price discriminate (Brennan et al., 1988; Petersen 
and Rajan, 1997). 
6 Also see Brechling and Lipsey (1963).   5 
continental European economies, the above listed studies  generally  focus on the 
determinants of trade credit and on its behaviour over the business cycle, without 
looking at how trade credit actually relates to firms’ real activities. 
This paper contributes to the literature by providing, for the first time, rigorous 
tests of whether trade credit affects UK firms’ activities and,  more specifically, of 
whether the trade credit  channel of transmission of monetary policy  plays an 
offsetting effect on the traditional credit channel in the UK (this hypothesis will be 
referred to as the offsetting hypothesis hereafter). Focusing on the UK rather than on 
continental European economies is particularly interesting: the UK financial system is 
in fact mainly market-based, whereas continental European countries are 
characterized by bank-based  financial systems ( Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
2002). One would expect therefore the trade credit channel to be stronger in the UK. 
Yet Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) document that firms in countries with 
larger and privately owned banking systems g enerally offer more financing to their 
customers and take more financing from them. To perform our tests, we will make use 
of 609 UK manufacturing sector companies over the period 1980-1999, collected by 
Datastream
7. 
In our econometric analysis, we will focus on the direct effect that trade credit 
plays on  firms’  inventory investment, and on the indirect effect that it has on the 
sensitivity of firms’ inventory investment to the coverage ratio. Three reasons justify 
our choice of inventory investment in our analysis. First, inventory investment plays a 
crucial role in business cycle fluctuations (Blinder and Maccini, 1991). Second, 
because of its high liquidity and low adjustment costs, inventory investment is likely 
to be more sensitive to financial variables (including trade credit) than investment in 
fixed capital (Carpenter et al., 1994). Third, trade credit is often related to the 
financing of inventories (Valderrama, 2003; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). We will only 
focus on accounts payables as a measure of trade credit usage, considering the firms 
in our data sets as borrowers
8. 
                                                 
7 These companies are all traded on the London Stock Exchange. Datastream has been widely used to 
test whether financial variables affect firms’ activities in the UK, and more in general to test for the 
presence of a credit channel of transmission of monetary policy (see for instance Blundell et al., 1992; 
Bond et al, 2002; Bond and Meghir, 1994; Guariglia, 1999, 2000 etc.). 
8 Other authors (Kohler et al., 2000; Choi and Kim, 2003; De Blasio, 2003) also considered the role 
played by trade credit extended. When bank lending is constrained, firms can in fact find additional 
financial resources either by relying more on trade credit received or by extending less trade credit to 
other firms.   6 
  Our results suggest that both the trade credit channel and the credit channel 
operate in the UK, and that there is evidence that the former channel weakens the 
latter. We find in  fact that when trade credit is added as a regressor to an inventory 
investment equation which already includes the coverage ratio, it generally affects the 
inventory investment at both financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Yet, the 
coverage ratio variable remains significant for the former firms. Furthermore, we find 
that when the effect of the coverage ratio is differentiated across 
constrained/unconstrained firms making a high/low use of trade credit, the coverage 
ratio only affects inventory investment at those constrained firms which make a low 
use of trade credit.  This suggests that using trade credit can help firms to offset 
liquidity problems. All our results are robust to replacing the variables in the coverage 
ratio with corresponding variables in cash flow. The finding that a strong trade credit 
channel, able to weaken the credit channel, operates in the UK is important as this 
channel is likely to dampen the effects of contractionary monetary policies, and more 
in general to make the recessions that generally follow these policies less severe. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe 
our data and present some descriptive statistics. Section 3 illustrates our baseline 
specification, our tests of the o ffsetting hypothesis,  and our  econometric 
methodology. Section 4 presents our results and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Main features of the data and summary statistics 
The data set 
The data used in this paper consist of UK quoted company balance sheets collected by 
Datastream. We  only  consider the manufacturing sector. Inventory investment 
includes investment in finished goods, raw materials, and work-in-progress. 
Our data set includes a total of 3892 annual observations on 609 companies 
for the years 1980 to 2000. The sample has an unbalanced structure, with the number 
of years of observations on each firm varying between 3 and 20
9. By allowing for 
both entry and exit, the use of an unbalanced panel partially mitigates potential 
selection and survivor bias. We excluded companies that changed the date of their 
accounting year-end by more than a few weeks, so that the data refer to 12 month 
accounting periods. Firms that did not have complete records on  inventory 
                                                 
9 See Appendix 1 for  more information on the structure of our panel and complete definitions of all 
variables used.   7 
investment, sales, the coverage ratio, trade credit, total assets, and short-term debt 
were also dropped
10. Finally, to control for the potential influence of outliers, we 
truncated the sample by removing observations beyond the 1
st and 99
th percentiles for 
each of the regression variables. 
 
Sample separation criteria 
To test whether  financial  and trade credit variables have a different impact on the 
inventory  investment of different types of firms, we partition firms according to 
whether they are more or less likely to face financing constraints using employees as a 
measure of size. In particular, we generate a dummy variable, SMALLit, which is equal 
to 1 if firm i has less than 250 employees in year t, and 0, otherwise
11. We allow firms 
to transit between size classes
12.  
To check robustness, we will explore results obtained using total real assets as 
an alternative  sample partitioning criterion. For this purpose, we will generate a 
dummy variable, SMALL1it, which is equal to 1 if firm i’s total assets are in the lowest 
quartile of the distribution of the total assets of all firms belonging to the same 
industry as firm i in year t, and 0, otherwise. 
  In order to verify whether the effects of financing  variables on inventory 
investment are different for firms that make a higher use of trade credit, we construct 
two additional dummies. The first one, HIGHTCit, is equal to 1 if the ratio of trade 
credit to total beginning-of-period assets for firm i in year t is in the highest quartile of 
the distribution of the ratios of all the firms in that particular industry and year, and 0 
otherwise. The ratio of a firm’s trade credit to total assets can be interpreted as the 
percentage of the firm’s total assets which is financed by trade credit
13. The second 
dummy, HIGHTC1it, is constructed in the same way but focuses on the ratio between 
the firm’s trade credit and the sum of its short-term debt and trade credit
14. The latter 
ratio can be seen as a “mix” variable similar to that used in Kashyap et al. (1993): it 
                                                 
10 These are the variables included in our regressions. 
11 A firm with less than 250 employees is much smaller than a typical “small” US firm. However, this 
number is appropriate in a European context, where firms are typically smaller than in the US (see 
Bank of England, 2002, for a discussion of various definitions of small, medium, and large firms). This 
sample separation criterion was also used in Carpenter and Guariglia (2003). 
12 For this reason, our empirical analysis will focus on firm-years rather than simply firms. See 
Carpenter and Guariglia (2003), Bond and Meghir (1994), Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Guariglia and 
Schiantarelli (1998), and Guariglia (2000) for a similar approach. 
13 See Fisman and Love (2002) for a discussion of why it is appropriate to deflate trade credit using the 
firm’s total assets. 
14 Short-term debt includes bank overdrafts, loans, and other short-term borrowing.   8 




Table 1 presents descriptive statistics relative to our full sample of firm-years, and to 
various sub-samples. Panel I of the Table focuses on the full sample and on the sub-
samples based on size. The average firm-year in our sample has 4214.6 employees, 
whereas the average small and large firm-years have respectively 156.7 and 4714.4 
employees.  Comparing columns  2 and  3, we can see that those firm-years 
characterized by relatively high employment display higher sales growth and a higher 
cash flow to capital ratio, compared to low employment firm-years. They also have a 
lower short-term debt to assets ratio. Although a slightly higher percentage of their 
total short-term finance comes from trade credit, these firm-years display a lower 
trade credit to total beginning-of-period real assets ratio. Finally, they seem to extend 
slightly  less trade credit to other firms. A similar pattern can be observed by 
comparing columns 4 and 5 of Table 1, which refer respectively to firm-years with 
relatively low and relatively high real assets. 
Panel 2 of Table 1 focuses on divisions based on trade credit usage. Columns 
1 and 2 refer respectively  to firm-years with a relatively  low and a relatively high 
ratio of trade credit to total beginning-of-period real assets. By comparing the two 
columns, we can see that those firm-years characterized by a relatively high ratio of 
trade credit to assets are generally smaller and more indebted, and display a much 
higher sales g rowth, and a  higher cash flow to  capital ratio. Furthermore, they 
generally  have a higher trade credit to short term debt plus trade credit ratio, and 
extend more trade credit to other firms compared to firm-years with a lower trade 
credit to assets ratio.  
When comparing firm-years according to their trade credit to short-term debt 
plus trade credit ratios (columns 3 and 4), we can see that the pattern is similar except 
for the fact that those firm-years displaying a lower use of trade credit relative to 
short-term debt generally display  higher s hort-term debt to assets ratios,  lower 
coverage ratios, and lower trade credit to assets ratios.  
The fact that those firm-years characterized by a relatively high use of trade-
credit are generally smaller, and therefore more likely to face financing constraints 
can be seen as very preliminary evidence in favour of the offsetting hypothesis. In the   9 
section that follows, we will formally test whether the trade credit channel plays a 
statistically significant effect in offsetting the credit channel. 
 
3.  Baseline specification, tests of the offsetting hypothesis, and estimation 
methodology 
Baseline specification 
The baseline specification that we will use is a variant of Lovell’s target adjustment 
model (1961)
15. Let I and S denote the logarithms of inventories and sales; and let 
COV denote the firm’s coverage ratio. Equation (1) gives the equation for inventory 
growth that we initially estimate.  
 
eit v jt vt vi COV it S t i I t i S t i Sit Iit + + + + + - - - + - D + D + = D b b b b b 4 ) ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ( 3 ) 1 ( 2 1 0   (1) 
 
The subscript i indexes firms; j, industries
16; and t, time, where t=1981-2000. The 
terms in COVit and in (Ii(t-1)-Si(t-1)) can be interpreted as reflecting the influence of a 
long-run target inventory level. In addition to these level terms, differences of the logs 
of sales are included in the regression to capture the short-run dynamics. This gives 
the specification an error-correction format. We expect b1, b2, and b4 to be positive 
and b3 to be negative
17. 
The error term in Equation (1) is made up of four components: vi, which is a 
firm-specific component;  vt, a time-specific component accounting for possible 
business cycle effects; vjt, a time-specific component which varies across industries 
                                                 
15 This specification is very similar to that used in Guariglia (1999). The two specifications differ in 
two main respects. First, in this paper, we do not include the lagged dependent variable. When this 
variable was included, its coefficient was in fact poorly determined, and the Sargan test (described 
below) indicated that its inclusion made the specification generally worse. We checked whether our 
main results still held when the lagged dependent variable was included in our estimating equation, and 
found that this was generally the case. Those results are not reported for brevity, but are available from 
the authors upon request.  Another difference between our specification and that used in Guariglia 
(1999) is that, as explained below, we include industry dummies interacted with time dummies, in 
addition to simple time dummies.  Also see Kashyap (1994), Carpenter at al. (1994, 1998), Small 
(2000), Choi and Kim (2001), Bagliano and Sembenelli (2002), Bo et al. (2002), and Benito (2002a, 
2002b) for similar reduced-form specifications. 
16 Firms are allocated to one of the following industrial sectors: metals, metal goods, other minerals, 
and mineral products; chemicals and man made fibres; mechanical engineering; electrical and 
instrument engineering; motor vehicles and parts, other transport equipment; food, drink, and tobacco; 
textiles, clothing, leather, footwear, and others (Blundell et al., 1992). 
17 The error-correction term, (Ii(t -1) – S i(t-1)) can in fact be interpreted as a term capturing the cost of 
inventories being far from a target level that is proportional to sales. Therefore, if inventories are higher 
(lower) than the target, one would expect inventory investment to decline (rise).   10 
accounting for industry-specific shifts in inventory investment demand (see Carpenter 
and Petersen, 2002; and Carpenter and Guariglia, 2003, for a discussion of this 
effect); and  eit, an idiosyncratic component. We control for  vi by estimating our 
equation in first-differences; for  vt by including time dummies; and for  vjt by 
including industry dummies interacted with time dummies in all our specifications.  
 
Tests for the offsetting hypothesis 
In order to formally verify the extent to which the existence of a trade credit channel 
weakens the traditional credit channel of transmission of monetary policy, we will 
undertake two tests. The first one consists in estimating an augmented version of 
Equation (1) of the following type: 
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where TCit denotes firm’s i accounts payable at time t; Ait, its total assets; and the ratio 
between these two  variables, the percentage of the firm’s total assets which is 
financed by trade credit. We will then verify whether the presence of trade credit in 
the equation reduces the significance of the coefficient associated with the coverage 
ratio. If both the coverage ratio and the trade credit variable enter the equation with 
positive coefficients, then one can conclude that there is evidence that both credit and 
trade credit  channels are operating.  If adding trade credit reduces the size and 
significance of the coefficient associated with the coverage ratio, then this could be 
seen as evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the trade credit channel  actually 
weakens the traditional credit channel (see De Blasio, 2003, for a similar approach). 
As financially constrained firm-years are more likely to be affected by 
financial variables  (including trade credit)  than unconstrained firm-years, we will 
perform this test differentiating the effects of the  coverage ratio and trade credit 
variables on the inventory investment of firm-years  more and less likely to face   11 
financing constraints. More specifically, we will estimate equations of the following 
type (including and excluding the terms in trade credit)
18: 
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The second way in which we test the offsetting effect of the credit channel by 
the trade credit channel consists in estimating a variant of Equation (1), in which the 
effect that the  coverage ratio plays on  firm-years’  inventory accumulation  is 
differentiated across the following four sub-categories of firm-years: small firm-years 
which make a relatively  low use of trade credit;  small firm-years which make a 
relatively high use of trade credit; large firm-years which make a relatively low use of 
trade credit; and large firm-years which make a relatively high use of trade credit. Our 
estimating equation will take the following form
19: 
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If the trade credit channel does play an offsetting effect on the credit channel, 
then one would expect the financial variables to only affect the inventory investment 
of those small firm-years that make less use of trade credit. Small firm-years making a 
higher use of trade credit should not be affected by changes in their liquidity positions 
                                                 
18 We also estimated more general versions of this equation, which included the dummy variable 
SMALL(1)it among the regressors. Since the later variable was never precisely determined, we omitted 
it from our preferred specifications. Note that the inclusion of the dummy did not change the magnitude 
and significance of the coefficients associated with the other regressors. 
19 Once again, we estimated more general versions of this equation, which included the dummy 
variables  SMALL(1)it   and  HIGH(1)it.  The coefficients associated with the dummies were never 
precisely determined and the main results were not changed by their inclusion.   12 
as much as other firm-years, as they can use trade credit to overcome the liquidity 




All equations will be estimated in first-differences, to allow for firm-specific, time-
invariant effects. Given the possible endogeneity of the regressors, we will use a first-
difference Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach
21. Two or more lags of 
each of the regressors including the interaction terms will be used as instruments
22. 
In order to evaluate whether the model is correctly specified, we will use two 
criteria: the Sargan test (also known as J test) and the test for second-order serial 
correlation of the residuals in the differenced equation (m2). If the model is correctly 
specified, the variables in the instrument set should be uncorrelated with the error 
term  in  the relevant e quation. The  J  test is the Sargan test for overidentifying 
restrictions, which, under the null of instrument validity, is asymptotically distributed 
as a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments less the 
number of parameters. The m2 test is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal 
under the null of no second-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals, and 
                                                 
20 Valderrama (2003) estimated regressions for investment in fixed capital, not inventory investment. 
Furthermore, she did not interact her explanatory variables with dummies indicating high/low use of 
trade credit by firms, but with a variable indicating the actual share of trade credit in short-term debt. 
21 See Arellano and Bond (1991) on the application of the GMM approach to panel data. The program 
DPD for Ox is used in estimation (Doornik et al., 2002). 
22 An alternative estimator which could be used is the GMM system estimator, which combines in a 
system the original specification expressed in first-differences and in levels. This estimator, developed 
in Blundell and Bond (1998) is generally used when the simple first-differenced GMM estimator 
suffers from serious finite small sample biases. This generally occurs when the instruments used with 
the standard first-differenced GMM estimator (i.e. the endogenous variables lagged two or more 
periods) are not very informative. A way to detect whether the simple first-differenced GMM estimator 
is affected by these finite sample biases is to compare the estimate of the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable obtained from the latter estimator with that obtained using the Within Groups 
estimator. As the Within Groups estimate is typically downward biased in short panels (Nickell, 1981), 
one would expect a consistent estimate of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable to lie above 
this estimate. Should one find that the estimate obtained using the first-differenced GMM estimator lies 
close or below the Within Groups estimate, then one could suspect the GMM estimate to be downward 
biased as well, possibly due to weak instruments (see Bond et al., 2001, for further discussion on this 
point). We therefore estimated a modified version of Equation (1), which included the lagged 
dependent variable, using the Within Groups and the GMM first-difference estimators. The coefficients 
associated with the lagged dependent variable were respectively 0.012 and 0.147.  Because the GMM 
first-difference estimate lied above the Within Groups estimate, we concluded that the GMM first-
difference estimates were unlikely to be subject to serious finite sample biases. Consequently, we did 
not report the estimates based on the GMM system estimator. These estimates, as well as the Within 
Groups estimates, are however available from the authors upon request.   13 
provides a further check on the specification of the model and on the legitimacy of 
variables dated t-2 as instruments in the differenced equation
23. 
 
4.  Empirical results 
First test of the offsetting hypothesis 
Column 1 of  Table 2 presents the estimates of Equation (1) performed on the full 
sample. We can see that sales growth has a positive and significant effect on 
inventory accumulation whereas the coefficient associated with lagged sales growth is 
not precisely determined. The coefficient  on  the error correction term has the 
expected negative sign, and the coefficient on the coverage ratio, a positive sign, 
suggesting that financial factors matter in determining inventory investment. 
Although small, the latter coefficient (0.0007) suggests that a one standard deviation 
rise in the coverage ratio increases inventory investment by about 3.6%. Compared to 
a mean inventory growth of 2.3% over the period considered in estimation, this is 
quite a large effect.  Neither the Sargan test nor the test of second-order 
autocorrelation of the residuals indicate problems with the specification of the model 
or the choice of the instruments.  
Column 2 of Table 2 presents the estimates of Equation (2). We can see that 
the trade credit to assets ratio attracts a positive, relatively large, and significant 
coefficient (0.707), which suggests that if the trade credit to assets ratio increases by 
one standard deviation, inventory investment rises by circa 7.3%. This can be seen as 
evidence in favour of the presence of a trade credit channel of transmission of 
monetary policy.  Yet, because the coefficient associated with the coverage ratio 
(0.0006)  is still positive, statistically significant, and of similar magnitude as in 
column 1, we can conclude that  although the  trade  credit channel seems to be 
stronger, there is no overwhelming evidence that the latter channel offsets the credit 
channel: both channels seem to be operating  side by side. It is noteworthy that 
comparing the Sargan statistics in column 1 and 2 suggests that adding the trade credit 
to assets ratio to Equation (1) generally improves the specification of the model
24. 
                                                 
23 If the undifferenced error terms are i.i.d., then the differenced residuals should display first-order, but 
not second-order serial correlation. In our Tables, we report both the test for first-order (m1) and the 
test for second-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals (m2). Note that neither the J test nor 
the m2 test allow to discriminate between bad instruments and model specification.  
24 Following De Blasio (2003), we also tried to differentiate the effects of the coverage ratio and trade 
credit across periods of recession and tight monetary policy and other periods. It has to be noted, 
however, that because our equations are estimated in first-differences, using the right-hand side   14 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 present the estimates of two versions of Equation 
(3): excluding and including the trade credit to assets ratio variables
25. The results in 
column 3, which exclude the trade credit variables, show that the estimated effect of 
the coverage ratio on inventory investment  is significant only at small firm-years. 
Furthermore, the point-estimate on the coverage ratio for small firm-years, 0.001, is 
larger than the corresponding point-estimate for the full-sample reported in column 1, 
namely 0.0007. This finding is consistent with the existence of a credit channel of 
transmission of monetary policy. If a firm’s coverage ratio increases, this suggests in 
fact an improvement in its balance sheet. Especially if the firm is more likely to face 
financing constraints, this will allow it to accumulate more inventories
26. 
Column 4 indicates that when the trade credit to assets ratio is included in the 
equation, it appears to significantly affect the inventory accumulation at both small 
and large firm-years in a similar way (the point-estimates are respectively equal to 
0.641 and 0.682 for the two types of firm-years)
27. Moreover, the addition of these 
trade credit variables to the equation does not affect the signs and significance of the 
coefficients on the coverage ratio variables. Once again, this result suggests that the 
credit channel and the trade credit channel operate side  by side, the latter being 
stronger than the former. Similar results w ere obtained when the firm-years were 
divided into small and large using total assets instead of employment as a sorting 
device (columns 5 and 6).  In  the latter specifications, however,  the coefficient 
                                                                                                                                            
variables lagged at least twice as instruments, the sample that we actually use in estimation only covers 
the time period 1982-2000, which includes only two periods of recession/tight monetary policy, namely 
1990 and 1991 (Guariglia, 1999). We therefore estimated an inventory investment equation similar to 
Equation (1), where the term in the coverage ratio was replaced with the following two interaction 
terms: COVit*RECit and COVit*(1-RECit), where RECit represents a dummy equal to 1 in the years 1990 
and 1991. We found that the coefficients associated with the interaction terms were both precisely 
determined, and respectively equal to 0.0009 (t-statistic: 2.31) and 0.0006 (t-statistic: 2.43). A similar 
pattern was found when interactions of the trade credit term with the dummies RECit and (1-RECit) 
dummies were included in the regression. In that case, the coefficients on the two interaction terms in 
the coverage ratio were respectively 0.0008 (t-statistic: 2.69) and 0.0006 (t-statistic: 2.58), and those on 
the trade credit interaction terms were respectively 1.04 (t-statistic: 2.64) and 0.79 (t-statistic: 2.47). 
These results suggest that both our financial variables have a stronger effect on firms’ inventory 
investment in periods of recession/tight monetary policy. 
25 Note that the number of observations in columns 3 and 4 is slightly smaller than the corresponding 
number in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, due to the fact that for some firm-years, the number of employees 
was missing. 
26 To check robustness, we interacted all the regressors with the SMALLit and (1- SMALLit) dummies. In 
line with the results reported in column 3 of Table 2, we found that the coefficients associated with the 
coverage ratio were 0.001 (t-statistic: 2.49) and 0.0003 (t-statistic: 1.35), respectively for small and 
large firm-years. Yet, the Sargan test (p-value: 0.018) indicated problems with this specification. As a 
further robustness test, we also re-estimated all our regressions replacing all variables in the coverage 
ratio with corresponding variables in cash flow. The results are presented and described in Appendix 2. 
27 This finding is consistent with Nilsen (2002), according to which large firms also make a significant 
use of trade credit, although they are assumed to have wider access to other cheaper forms of credit.   15 
associated with the coverage ratio was statistically significant for both small and large 
firm-years, although always bigger in magnitude for the former
28. 
 
Second test of the offsetting hypothesis 
Table 3 reports the results of the estimation of Equation (4), where the coefficient 
associated with the coverage ratio is differentiated across small  firm-years  making 
low use of trade credit; small firm-years making high use of trade credit; large firm-
years making low use of trade credit; and large firm-years making high use of trade 
credit
29.  This differentiation  is aimed at assessing the extent to which financially 
constrained firm-years can use trade credit to overcome liquidity constraints. Columns 
1 and 2 use the ratio of trade credit to assets as an indicator for whether a firm makes 
high or low use of trade credit. Focusing on column 1, where employment is used to 
partition firm-years into small and large, we can see that the coverage ratio attracts a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient only for small firm-years that make a 
relatively low use of trade credit
 30. A similar finding characterizes column 2, where 
total assets are used instead of employment to partition firm-years across more and 
less likely to face liquidity constraints. 
  Finally, columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 use the ratio of trade credit to trade credit 
plus short-term debt as an indicator for whether a firm makes high or low use of trade 
credit. Column 3 partitions firm-years into small and large using employment as a 
sorting  device. In this specification, the coverage ratio term for small firm-years 
making a low use of trade credit attracts a positive coefficient (0.002), significant at 
the 10% level. Although the corresponding coefficient for small firm-years making a 
high use of trade credit is significant at the 5% level, it is smaller in magnitude 
(0.0006). In column 4,  total assets are used to partition firm-years into small and 
large. The coefficient associated with the coverage ratio is once again significant at 
the 5% level only for small firm-years making a low use of trade credit.  
                                                 
28 In column 6, the Sargan test indicates some problems with the choice of instruments and/or the 
specification of the model. These problems persisted when the instruments were lagged three times 
instead of twice. 
29 See Appendix 2 for similar regressions where all variables in the coverage ratio are replaced with 
corresponding variables in cash flow. 
30 We also estimated a n alternative specification, which included four additional interaction terms, 
namely the trade credit to assets ratio interacted with the small/large and the high/low trade credit 
usage dummies. The coefficients associated with the coverage ratio exhibited a very similar pattern as 
those described in column 1. The coefficients associated with the trade credit to assets ratio were 
precisely determined for all categories of firm-years. These results are not reported for brevity, but are 
available from the authors upon request.   16 
These results can be seen as evidence in favour of an offsetting effect of the 
credit channel by the trade credit channel. Those firm-years that are small, and 
therefore more likely to be financially constrained seem in fact to be less constrained 
by their coverage ratios if they make a relatively high use of trade credit. This 
suggests that using trade credit can help firms to offset liquidity problems. 
In all specifications in Table 3, neither the Sargan test, nor the test for second 
order autocorrelation of the residuals indicate any problems with the model 
specification, nor the choice of instruments. The Sargan test actually appears to 
perform better for this model with many interactions, suggesting that differentiating 
the effect of the coverage  ratio for various categories of firm-years improves  the 
specification of the model. 
  Overall, our two sets of tests suggest that there is some evidence that both the 
credit channel and the trade credit channel of transmission of monetary policy operate 
in the UK, the latter being stronger than the former. Our second set of results also 
suggests that there is some evidence that the trade credit channel weakens the credit 
channel. These results are in line with the findings in Atanasova and Wilson (2004), 
Mateut and Mizen (2002), Mateut et al. (2002), and Kohler et al. (2000). 
 
5.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we have used a panel of 609 UK firms over the period 1980-2000 to test 
for the presence of a trade credit channel of transmission of monetary policy and for 
whether this channel offsets the credit channel. We have conducted two sets of tests to 
achieve this objective. First, we have augmented a traditional  error-correction 
inventory investment equation with a coverage ratio variable and a trade credit to 
assets variable, and we have estimated it differentiating the effects of the latter two 
variables for small and large firm-years. Our second test consisted in the estimation of 
an inventory investment error-correction equation augmented with the coverage ratio, 
differentiating the effects of the latter variable across small firm-years making a low 
use of trade credit; small firm-years making a high use of trade credit; large firm-
years making a low use of trade credit; and large firm-years making a high use of 
trade credit.  
The results of our first test suggested that both credit and trade credit channels 
of transmission of monetary policy operate side by side in the UK, the latter having 
stronger effects than the  former. Those of  our second test, according to which the   17 
coverage ratio generally plays a stronger effect on the inventory investment of those 
small firm-years making a relatively low use of trade credit,  also  showed some 
evidence in favour of the fact that the trade credit channel weakens the credit channel. 
These findings are important as they suggest that the trade credit channel is likely to 
dampen the effects of contractionary monetary policies, and more in general to make 
the recessions that generally follow these policies less severe. 
In the light of our results, we can conclude that a possible explanation for why, 
contrary to the mainstream literature, authors such as Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and 
Cleary (1999)  found that  those firms  facing tighter financing constraints actually 
exhibit a lower sensitivity of investment to  financial variables could be that  these 
firms make a heavy use of trade credit, offsetting therefore their liquidity constraints. 
An alternative explanation could be that these firms are actually financially 
distressed. They  might therefore have reached the minimum level of investment 
necessary to carry on production: further reductions in investment would therefore be 
impossible, even in response to declines in  cash  flow. Financially distressed firms 
might also  be required by their creditors to use their cash flow to meet interest 
payments and/or improve the liquidity of their balance sheet (Fazzari et al., 2000; 
Huang, 2002; Allayannis and Monumbar, 2004; Cleary et al., 2004).  
In order to shed more light on these alternative explanations, the behaviour of 
those financially constrained firms, which face the most severe financing constraints 
should be carefully analyzed. As firms belonging to the latter category are more likely 
not to be quoted on the stock market, datasets which contain unquoted firms should be 
used for this purpose. This is on the agenda for future research.   18 
Appendix 1: Data appendix 
 

















































































Total  609  100.00   
 
Inventories: 
They are defined as Datastream variable number 364 (v364), which includes finished 
goods, raw materials, work-in-process less any advances paid, and any other stocks. 
 
Sales: 
It is defined as v104, i.e. the amount of sales of goods and services to third parties 
relating to the normal industrial activities of the company. 
 
Coverage ratio: 
It is defined as (v137+v144)/(v150+v151), where 
v137 is  net profit derived from normal activities of the company after 
depreciation and operating provisions. 
v144 includes dividend income, interest received, rents, grants and any other 
non-operating income.  
v150 shows interest on loans which are repayable in less than five years.  
v151 shows interest on loans which are repayable in five years or more.    19 
 
Trade credit:  
It is defined as v276, which includes trade payables within and after one year relating 
to the normal business activities of the company. 
 
Trade debt:  
It is defined as v287, which includes trade receivables within and after one year 
relating to the normal business activities of the company. 
 
Short-term-debt: 
It is defined as v309, which includes bank overdrafts, loans, and other short-term 
borrowing. 
 
Total number of employees: 




It is defined as v392, i.e.  the sum of tangible fixed assets, intangible assets, 
investments, other assets, total stocks and work-in-progress, total debtors and 
equivalent, and cash and cash equivalents. 
 
Cash flow: 
We define cash flow as follows: v623+v136, where: 
v623 is defined as published after tax profit. 
v136 is defined as depreciation. 
 
Replacement value of the capital stock: 
The replacement value of capital stock is calculated using the perpetual inventory 
formula (Blundell et al., 1992; Bond and Meghir, 1994). We use v339=tangible fixed 
assets (net) as the historic value of the capital stock. We then assume that replacement 
cost and historic cost are the same in the first year of data for each firm. We then 
apply the perpetual inventory formula as follows:  
replacement value of capital stock at time t+1 =    20 
replacement value at time t*(1-dep)*(pt+1 /pt )+ investment at time t+1,  
where  dep represents the firm-specific depreciation rate, and  pt i s the price of 
investment goods, which we proxy with the implicit deflator for gross fixed capital 
formation. To calculate the depreciation rate, dep, we use rates of 8.19% for plant and 
machinery, and 2.5% for land and buildings. These are taken from King and Fullerton 
(1984). For each observation, we then calculate the proportion of land and building 
investment, as follows:  
(gross book value of all land and building - accumulated depreciation on land 
and building)/(gross total fixed assets - accumulated depreciation of total fixed 
assets), i.e. (v327-v335)/(v330-v338). 
We then calculate an average value of this ratio for each firm, which we call mprlb. 
The firm-specific depreciation rate would then be given by:  
dep = 0.0819*(1-mprlb)+0.025*mprlb. 
 
Deflators: 
All variables, except the capital stock, are deflated using the aggregate GDP deflator. 
The capital stock is deflated using the implicit price deflator for gross fixed capital 
formation. 
 
Appendix 2: Replacing all variables in the coverage ratio with  corresponding 
variables in cash flow. 
 
To check for robustness, we repeated both our tests of the offsetting hypothesis 
replacing the coverage ratio with the cash flow to beginning-of-period capital stock in 
our regressions. This test is also aimed at making our results  more  directly 
comparable to those in Benito (2002a, 2002b), Bo et al. (2002), Carpenter et al. (1994, 
1998), Choi and Kim (2001), and Small (2000), who used cash flow in their inventory 
investment regressions. The cash-flow to capital ratio has also been widely used in 
investment equations to test for the possibility that investment spending is subject to 
financing constraints (see Fazzari et al., 1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Cleary, 
1999 etc.) 
The estimates relative to our first test of the offsetting hypothesis are reported 
in Table A1. Columns 3 and 5 show that cash flow only affects inventory investment 
at small firm-years. When the trade credit to assets ratio was added to our inventory   21 
investment regression, the coefficient associated with cash flow remained significant, 
although smaller in magnitude, for small firm-years when employment was used to 
partition the sample (column 4), but lost significance when total assets were used 
(column 6). Finally, when we replaced the coverage ratio with cash flow in the 
regressions without interactions, the coefficient on the latter variable was generally 
poorly determined (columns 1 and 2). Yet, the Sargan test indicated problems with 
these simplified specifications. As the coefficients on the trade credit variables were 
precisely determined in most of the regressions, these results confirm our previous 
conclusion that the trade credit channel plays an important role in the UK. 
Furthermore, compared to the estimates reported in Table 2, these results also seem to 
provide stronger evidence in favour of the fact that the trade credit channel weakens 
the credit channel. 
The estimates relative to  our second test of the offsetting hypothesis  are 
reported in Table A2. The results in columns 1, 3, and 4 are in line with those in Table 
3, and suggest that cash flow only affects inventory investment at those small firms 
making a relatively low use of trade credit. Surprisingly, however, the estimates in 
column 2, where firm-years are partitioned on the basis of total assets and the trade 
credit to assets ratio, suggest that it is those small firm-years that make a heavier use 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics. 
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3435  418  3196  696 
 
Notes: The Table reports sample means. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. The 
subscript i indexes firms, and the subscript t, time, where t=1981-2000. SMALLit is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if firm i has 250 employees or more at time t, and equal to 0 otherwise. SMALL1it is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if firm  i’s total assets are in the lowest quartile of the distribution of the 
total assets of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i in year t, and 0, otherwise. I represents 
the logarithm of the firm’s inventory investment; S, the logarithm of its sales; A, its total real assets; 
Emp, its total number of employees; CF, its cash flow; K, its capital stock; COVER, its coverage ratio; 
STD, its short-term debt; TC, its trade credit (accounts payable); and TD, its trade debt (accounts 
receivable).   28 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (continued). 
 
Panel II 

























































































































STDit / Ai(t-1) 
 
 
TCit / Ai(t-1) 
 
 





































         















814  2937  955 
 
Notes: The Table reports sample means. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. The 
subscript i indexes firms, and the subscript t, time, where t=1981-2000. HIGHTCit is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the ratio of trade credit to total beginning-of-period real assets for firm i in year t is in the 
highest quartile of the distribution of the ratios of all the firms in that particular industry and year, and 
0 otherwise. HIGHTC1it is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ratio of trade credit to the sum of trade 
credit and short-term debt for firm i in year t is in the highest quartile of the distribution of the ratios of 
all the firms in that particular industry and year, and 0 otherwise. I represents the logarithm of the 
firm’s inventory investment; S, the logarithm of its sales; A, its total real assets; Emp, its total number 
of employees; CF, its cash flow; K, its capital stock; COVER, its coverage ratio; STD, its short-term 
debt; TC, its trade credit (accounts payable); and TD, its trade debt (accounts receivable).   29 































































































       
COVit*(SMALL(1)it) 
 




















  0.707** 
(0.32) 
       
(TCit/Ai(t-1))*SMALL(1)it 
 
      0.641* 
(0.40) 





      0.682*** 
(0.27) 























Sargan/Hansen (p-value)  0.071  0.129  0.059  0.080  0.087  0.024 
 
Note:  All specifications were estimated using a GMM first-difference specification. The figures 
reported in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and time dummies interacted 
with industry dummies were included in all specifications. Standard errors and test statistics are 
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. m1 (m2) is a test for first- (second-) order serial correlation 
in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under 
the null of instrument validity. Instruments in column (1) are (Ii(t-2)-Si(t-2)); DSi(t -2); COVi(t-2). Instruments 
in column (2) also include TCi(t-2) /Ai(t-3). Instruments in columns (3) and (5) are (Ii(t-2)-Si(t-2)); DSi(t-2); 
COVi(t-2) *(SMALLi(t-2)); COVi(t-2) *(1-SMALLi(t-2)) and further lags. Instruments in column (4) are (Ii(t-2)-
Si(t-2)); DSi(t-2);  COVi(t-2)  *(SMALLi(t-2)); COVi(t-2) *(1-SMALLi(t-2));  TCi(t-3) /Ai(t-4)  *(SMALLi(t-3)); TCi(t-3) 
/Ai(t -4)  *(1-SMALLi(t-3)) and further lags.  Instruments in column (6) are  (Ii(t-2)-Si(t-2)); DSi(t-2); COVi(t-2) 
*(SMALLi(t -2)); COVi(t-2) *(1-SMALLi(t-2)); TCi(t-2) /Ai(t-3) *(SMALLi(t-2)); TCi(t-2) /Ai(t-3) *(1-SMALLi(t-2)) and 
further lags. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always included 
in the instrument set. Also see Notes to Table 1. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Sargan/Hansen (p-value)  0.061  0.206  0.109  0.218 
 
Notes: Instruments in all columns are (Ii(t-2)-Si(t-2)); DSi(t-2); COVi(t-2) *(SMALLi(t-2)) *(HIGHi(t-2)); COVi(t-
2) *(SMALLi(t-2)) *(1-HIGHi(t-2)); COVi(t-2) *(1-SMALLi(t -2)) *(HIGHi(t-2)); COVi(t-2) *(1-SMALLi(t -2)) *(1-
HIGHi(t-2)) and further lags. Also see Notes to Tables 1 and 2. * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.   31 
Table A1: Results of the first test of the offsetting hypothesis when all variables 































































































       
(CFit /Ki(t-1))*(SMALL(1)it) 
 




















  0.756** 
(0.31) 
       
(TCit /Ai(t-1))*SMALL(1)it 
 
      0.446 
(0.44) 





      1.024*** 
(0.32) 























Sargan/Hansen (p-value)  0.053  0.038  0.116  0.001  0.125  0.01 
 
Note: Instruments in column (1) are (Ii(t-2)-Si(t-2)); DSi(t-2); (CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3)). Instruments in column (2) also 
include  TCi(t-2) /Ai(t-3). Instruments in columns (3)  and (5)  are ( Ii(t-2)-Si(t-2));  DSi(t-2);  (CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-
3))*(SMALLi(t-2)); (CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3)) *(1-SMALLi(t-2)). Instruments in column (4) and (6) also include TCi(t-2) 
/Ai(t -3) *(SMALLi(t-2)); TCi(t-2) /Ai(t-3) *(1-SMALLi(t-2)). Time dummies and time dummies interacted with 
industry dummies were always included in the instrument set. Also see Notes to Table 1. * indicates 
significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 
1% level. 
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Table A2: Results of the second test of the offsetting hypothesis when  all 
























































































































Sargan/Hansen (p-value)  0.124  0.164  0.071  0.133 
 
Notes: Instruments in all  columns are ( Ii(t -2)-Si(t -2));  DSi(t-2); (CFi(t-2)/Ki(t -3))*(SMALLi(t-2)) *(HIGHi(t-2)); 
(CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3))*(SMALLi(t-2)) *(1-HIGHi(t-2)); COVi(t-2) *(1-SMALLi(t-2)) *(HIGHi(t-2)); (CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3))*(1-
SMALLi(t-2)) *(1-HIGHi(t-2)) and further lags. Also see Notes to Tables 1 and 2. * indicates significance 
at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 